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DO THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S LEGAL STANDARDS
ON CLASS CERTIFICATION INCENTIVIZE
FORUM SHOPPING?: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S
CLASS CERTIFICATION JURISPRUDENCE
Shrey Sharma*
The Class Action Fairness Act altered the jurisdictional landscape of
class actions by relaxing the barriers to satisfying diversity jurisdiction in
federal court. As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys frequently find themselves
filing class actions in federal court, and face the critical question of where
to initiate their lawsuit. Many plaintiffs’ attorneys consider the favorability
of legal standards when determining the forum in which to file their class
action. Among other substantive and procedural considerations, the
applicable class certification standards of the forum are an important
forum selection factor.
The Second Circuit, in particular, is a forum that plaintiffs’ attorneys
might consider due to its novel class certification standards on a range of
unique areas of certification. Plaintiffs seeking certification of very
discrete class actions will be mindful of the Second Circuit’s certification
criteria when deciding on a forum for their class action. This Note details
the Second Circuit’s class certification jurisprudence on the standard of
appellate review of interlocutory appeals, satisfaction of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement in Rule 23(c)(4)
single issue class actions, and certification of defendant classes under Rule
23(b)(2). This Note assesses whether these certification standards
encourage forum shopping in district courts within the Second Circuit in
light of the contrasting standards that other circuits have adopted on these
issues.
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INTRODUCTION
Attorney X is plaintiffs’ counsel for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3) class of residents suing manufacturers for releasing waste in
Alabama over an eighty-five year period.1 Attorney X could file in state
court, but, most likely, opposing counsel would successfully remove the
action to federal court.2 Rather than spending resources fighting removal,
Attorney X decides to initially file his case in federal court to expedite the

1. This class description is similar to the class in an Eleventh Circuit opinion. See
Evans v. Walter Indus., 449 F.3d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir. 2006).
2. As this Note later discusses, the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) has significantly
expanded federal removal jurisdiction over class action lawsuits that begin in state court. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012); infra Part I.A.
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process. However, he has an important decision to make that could shape
the course of the litigation.3 He has to choose which federal forum is most
suitable to his class action: Forum A or Forum B?
On one hand, Forum A might be a reasonable option, but it has strict
requirements for satisfying predominance in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions,
which could defeat his action at the class certification stage.4 Moreover, if
certification is denied, it is unlikely that he will win an appeal because
Forum A reviews certification decisions under the deferential “abuse of
discretion standard.”5
On the other hand, Forum B has adopted a more lenient approach to
predominance, increasing the odds that Attorney X’s class will be certified
by the district court.6 Additionally, Forum B’s standard of appellate review
is deferential to the district court only when the district court grants class
certification.7 Forum B provides no deference to denials of class
certification by the trial court.8 Therefore, if the trial court certifies the
class, Attorney X can remain confident that the appellate court in Forum B
will not reverse the trial court decision.9 If, however, the trial court denies
class certification, there is a probability that the trial court’s certification
denial will be reversed by the appellate court.10
All other things being equal, which forum does Attorney X choose?
Common sense dictates that he will choose Forum B because it strategically
gives his action the best chance to move past the significant hurdle of class
certification.11
Attorneys considering various federal venues might likewise be
incentivized to file their class actions in district courts within the Second
Circuit because, like Forum B, it has legal standards that appear to favor
class certification on several grounds.12 The Second Circuit varies from
other federal circuits on major issues in federal class action practice,
ranging from the appropriate standard of appellate review in class
certification appeals to the applicability of Rule 23(b)(2) to defendant class
actions.13 This is critical in light of the fact that class certification has
become less frequent in federal court, with fewer than one-fifth of all

3. See infra Part I.B.
4. Forum A’s predominance standard mirrors the Fifth Circuit approach in single issue
class actions. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996).
5. Abuse of discretion is deferential to the trial court. See infra Part II.A.2; see also In
re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 798 (5th Cir. 2014).
6. Forum B’s predominance standard mirrors the Second Circuit’s approach in single
issue class actions. See In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir.
2006).
7. This is the Second Circuit’s standard of appellate review on class certification. See
Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See infra Part III.A.1.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
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classes getting certified.14 Thus, the Second Circuit’s approach warrants
further scrutiny to see whether it actually incentivizes attorneys to choose it
as a forum.
This Note analyzes the Second Circuit’s class certification jurisprudence
to determine whether its legal standards favor class certification. It then
compares the Second Circuit’s approach to other forums, emphasizing the
differences that make the Second Circuit’s standards favorable to
certification. Ultimately, this Note evaluates the notion that the Second
Circuit’s legal standards incentivize attorneys to file there to get class
certification.15
Part I of this Note provides background on class action practice in federal
court, including how the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) expanded
federal jurisdiction over class actions and the factors that attorneys consider
when making decisions on choice of forum for class action litigation. Part
II discusses the Second Circuit’s approach on three areas of certification:
(1) the standard of appellate review of interlocutory appeals,16 (2)
satisfaction of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement in Rule 23(c)(4)
single issue class actions,17 and (3) certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) defendant
class.18 Part II then compares the Second Circuit’s approach on these issues
to the approach of other forums. Next, Part III assesses whether the Second
Circuit’s standards on class certification encourage attorneys to file their
class actions in the Second Circuit. Finally, this Note answers that question
in the affirmative, concluding that the Second Circuit’s applicable legal
standards entice attorneys to file their class actions within the circuit.
I. A TREND TOWARD HORIZONTAL FORUM SHOPPING
IN FEDERAL COURT
Before analyzing whether the Second Circuit encourages forum
shopping, it is important to explain the state of class action certification
jurisprudence today. Part I.A discusses the 2005 enactment of CAFA and
its impact on federal jurisdiction over class actions. Part I.B then surveys
the factors that attorneys consider when making forum selection decisions
in light of CAFA.

14. See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in
Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 605
(2006); see also 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:18, at 50 (5th
ed. 2011).
15. It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit has similar standards in some areas of
class certification jurisprudence. See, e.g., Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 673 (9th Cir.
2014). This Note focuses on the Second Circuit.
16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
17. See id. 23(b)(3), (c)(4).
18. See id. 23(b)(2).
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A. CAFA and the Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction
over Class Actions
CAFA supplements Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
federal court.19 CAFA was enacted as a part of the tort reform movement
to eliminate forum shopping in state courts and reduce attorney’s fees in
class action settlements.20 It sought to accomplish this by expanding
diversity and removal jurisdiction in class action lawsuits.21 In essence, the
legislative intent behind CAFA was to prevent forum shopping from
plaintiffs’ attorneys in state court by giving defendants the ability to forum
shop “horizontally”—meaning among the federal courts only and not the
state system—in federal court through removal jurisdiction.22
It is important to note the kind of forum shopping that occurs in federal
class actions today. CAFA enables “horizontal” forum shopping among the
federal courts.23 CAFA makes “vertical” forum shopping, where attorneys
have a choice between filing their class action in state or federal court, more
difficult because the jurisdictional rules of CAFA are crafted in favor of
federal jurisdiction.24 A plaintiffs’ attorney can only remand his case to
state court if he is able to shape his class in a way that fits one of CAFA’s
exceptions by preserving the action as predominantly a statewide, rather
than a nationwide, action.25
There has been an increase in federal class actions as a result of CAFA.26
This can be explained, in part, by the relaxed diversity requirements for
class actions in federal court.27 Plaintiffs’ lawyers who wish to file their
class actions in federal court have to meet fairly minimal standards for
diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy requirement.28
Therefore, they face few jurisdictional obstacles in filing their cases in
federal court.29
19. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012).
20. See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1593, 1597–602 (2008).
21. See id. at 1608.
22. See id. at 1607.
23. See Justin D. Forlenza, Note, CAFA and Erie: Unconstitutional Consequences?, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1065, 1085–86 (2006).
24. See id. at 1086.
25. See id.
26. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste
and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1562 (2008).
27. Prior to CAFA, diversity jurisdiction required complete diversity between the named
plaintiffs and the defendants. See Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365
(1921). Additionally, the amount in controversy for the class representative had to exceed
$75,000, while class members could satisfy the amount in controversy by alleging claims
less than $75,000 if they were added as tagalong claims under supplemental jurisdiction. See
Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204, 205 (8th Cir. 1968). CAFA eased the requirements for
diversity jurisdiction by requiring minimal diversity of citizenship, which demands only that
any plaintiff in the case has to be diverse from any defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)
(2012). CAFA also created a $5 million amount in controversy that needs to be satisfied
only in the aggregate and not on an individual basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
29. See id.
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CAFA, however, also works to the benefit of defendants.30 Defendants
seeking to remove the case from state court to federal court likely can
unless the class fits a number of jurisdictional exceptions that would
remand the case to state court.31 These exceptions include the “local
controversy” exception,32 “the home state” exception,33 and the
discretionary jurisdiction exception.34 Federal district courts also cannot
exercise jurisdiction over cases where the state is the primary defendant
against whom the district court would be unable to order relief or where
there were fewer than one hundred proposed plaintiff class members.35
Although defendants have the burden of proof on removal, they only need
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that federal jurisdiction
exists.36
The number of removals from state court to federal court has increased
after the enactment of CAFA.37 The data show that this increase applies to
the exercise of both federal question and removal jurisdiction.38 Indeed, the
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. The first exception to minimal diversity compels the district court to decline
jurisdiction if more than two-thirds of the proposed class are citizens of the forum state
where the action was originally filed and at least one of the defendants is one “from whom
significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class; whose alleged conduct forms a
significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and who is a citizen
of the State in which the action was originally filed.” See id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II). Remand
to state court is also required if the “principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or
any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was
originally filed,” id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III), and “during the 3-year period preceding the
filing of that class action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar
factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons,” id.
§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii). See Steven M. Puiszis, Developing Trends with the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 134 (2006).
33. The second exception to minimal diversity requires that at least two-thirds of the
proposed class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the forum state where the
action was originally filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B); see also Puiszis, supra note 32, at
134.
34. The third exception to CAFA’s minimal diversity exception is discretionary and
allows a district court to decline jurisdiction over a class action where between one-third and
two-thirds of the class members are citizens of the forum state where the action was
originally filed. The district court can consider a number of factors pertinent to this
determination, including
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid
Federal jurisdiction; (D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct
nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants; (E) whether the
number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed in all
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number
of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the
proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of States; and (F) whether,
during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or more other
class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other
persons have been filed.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(C)–(F); see also Puiszis, supra note 32, at 141–42.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
36. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 553–54 (2014).
37. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 14, § 1:18, at 48.
38. See id.
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number of diversity filings has increased by nearly 72 percent since CAFA
was enacted.39 Moreover, efforts to circumvent CAFA by plaintiffs’
lawyers seeking to keep their class actions in state court have had varying
results; the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly rejected attempts to keep the
amount in controversy under $5 million, while attempts to keep the number
of plaintiffs under one hundred have found more success.40
Appellate courts have the power to exercise review over trial court
decisions to grant removal.41 It is unclear how frequently they choose to
exercise this power. It is clear, however, that the nature of forum selection
for plaintiffs has changed as a result of CAFA, largely shifting the emphasis
of massive class actions from state forums to federal forums.42
B. Forum Shopping Decisions in Federal Court
Data show that federal class action filings have continued to increase in
recent years.43 While the expansion of removal jurisdiction likely accounts
for a significant portion of this increase, it appears that a majority of
diversity class actions now originate in federal court because attorneys wish
to avoid delays that accompany removal from state court.44 The
jurisdiction in which a class action is filed becomes a central strategic
decision for plaintiffs’ attorneys who have options regarding the venue for
the class action.45 Forum selection plays a prominent role in class action
strategy, particularly if plaintiffs choose to circumvent the removal process
39. See id.
40. See 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:17, at 559–62 (5th
ed. 2012).
41. See id. § 6:15, at 548–49.
42. See Erichson, supra note 20, at 1607–08.
43. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Alexandra D. Lahav, The New Class Action Landscape:
Trends and Developments in Class Certification and Related Topics 58 (Ctr. for Law &
Econ. Studies, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 435, 2012); see also
Erichson, supra note 20, at 1611. Securities class actions account for nearly half of all class
actions. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & DANIEL WOLF, CLASS CERTIFICATION: TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS (2004–2009), at 18 tbl. 1 (2009), http://
www.gotofirm.com/content/uploads/2012/12/CLASS-CERTIFICATION-DevelopmentsOver-the-Last-Five-Years-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6L7-9XRQ]. According to recent
data, more than sixty securities class actions were filed in the Second Circuit in 2014, while
fifty were filed in the Ninth Circuit. See RENZO COMOLLI & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA
ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2014 FULLYEAR REVIEW 10 (2015), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2015/
PUB_Full_Year_Trends_2014_0115.pdf [https://perma.cc/A78H-2PAH]. After these two
circuits, no other circuit received more than twenty-six securities class action filings in 2014.
See id. However, this data fails to explain whether the Second Circuit is actually a plaintifffriendly forum—the Second Circuit naturally may see more securities filings because it
encompasses all of New York City.
44. See Erichson, supra note 20, at 1611; see also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E.
Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical
Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1759 (2008). Under CAFA,
appellate judges may take sixty days to review a remand motion upon the filing of appeal
and may extend this deadline under special circumstances or if the parties agree. See 28
U.S.C. § 1453(c) (2012).
45. See BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK § 3.04, at 86–88
(2014); Lee & Willging, supra note 44, at 1759.
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and affirmatively decide to file their case in federal court.46 This is because
the choice of venue is left to the plaintiffs, who can choose from an
assortment of federal forums and must weigh the favorability of the forum’s
procedural and substantive law to the class, the convenience of the location,
and other factors.47
The factors that attorneys consider when choosing a federal forum are
critical in understanding why the Second Circuit’s class certification
standards matter. One study demonstrates that the perceived favorableness
of the applicable substantive or procedural federal law is an important
forum selection factor for attorneys choosing a venue for their federal class
actions.48
This stems out of attorney perceptions of a judge’s
predispositions to rule for one side or the other.49 The study indicates that
among other considerations, these perceptions were based on attorneys’
judgments regarding the receptivity of the court to the attorneys’ claims.50
This was measured by surveying 728 attorneys who filed class actions in
federal court or had them removed to federal court by asking which factors
were most important in their forum selection decision.51 This factor was
found to be a “primary” factor in the report generated from the study.52
For defendants removing the case from state to federal court, strict class
certification standards are an important feature of a desirable federal
forum.53 In fact, 47 percent of the surveyed defendants who removed their
class actions to federal court reported favorable class certification procedure
as a reason for removal.54 A small percentage of defense attorneys seeking
class certification of a settlement considered the receptiveness of the court
toward settlement, which necessarily entails certification.55
Plaintiffs are less likely to file their class action in federal court based on
the applicable class certification standards in large part because federal
courts are more likely to deny class certification motions than state courts.56
However, this does not necessarily tell the whole story. Generally,
plaintiffs’ attorneys do not file their class actions in federal court by
choice.57 This study did not differentiate between plaintiffs’ attorneys who
filed in federal court to bypass the inevitable process of losing on a remand
46. See Erichson, supra note 20, at 1607; see also Rory Ryan, Note, Uncertifiable?: The
Current Status of Nationwide State-Law Class Actions, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 467, 468 (2002)
(finding that state choice of law questions often defeat certification of nationwide class
actions).
47. See Willging & Wheatman, supra note 14, at 613–14.
48. See id. at 612; see also Genevieve G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law
Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2009) (noting that
choice of law issues frequently factor into state law class actions in federal court).
49. See Willging & Wheatman, supra note 14, at 624–25.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 601.
52. See id. at 611.
53. See id. at 618.
54. See id. at 617.
55. See id.; see also FED R. CIV. P. 23(e).
56. See Willging & Wheatman, supra note 14, at 635. State law is typically more
favorable than federal law on class certification for plaintiffs. See id. at 637–38.
57. See id.
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motion and plaintiffs’ attorneys who filed in federal court because it
conferred some advantage to the class action that could not be found in state
court.58 Regardless of the reason for filing in federal court, plaintiffs’
attorneys are highly cognizant of the applicable substantive law that might
favor their claims.59
One study indicates that the Second Circuit, in addition to the Ninth
Circuit, is considered lenient relative to other federal courts in granting
class certification, and thus plaintiffs’ attorneys believe that their class is
more likely to be certified in this jurisdiction.60 Conversely, the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits are perceived as being less lenient in granting class
certification.61 A detailed discussion on the Second Circuit’s class
certification jurisprudence in contrast to other federal forums is necessary to
understand whether these perceived notions were formed due to leniency in
granting certification.
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S
CLASS CERTIFICATION JURISPRUDENCE
The Second Circuit and the other circuits appear to be at odds with
respect to class action jurisprudence. This split in judicial philosophy is
prevalent in three main areas of class certification: the standard of appellate
review of class certification, satisfaction of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
requirement in single issue Rule 23(c)(4) class actions, and certification of
defendant classes under Rule 23(b)(2).
Part II.A provides a comparative analysis between the Second Circuit’s
standard of appellate review of class certification decisions and those of the
other circuits. Next, Part II.B contrasts the Second Circuit’s standard on
predominance in 23(b)(3) class actions, where single issues are receiving
class treatment, to another approach. Then, Part II.C then analyzes the
Second Circuit’s unique approach toward 23(b)(2) defendant class actions,
which varies from the approach of the other circuits.
A. Standard of Appellate Review for Class Certification
As a general principle, appellate courts review lower court rulings on
class certification under the abuse of discretion standard.62 The abuse of
discretion standard is extremely deferential, and an appellate court will
58. See id.
59. See id. at 616.
60. See Erichson, supra note 20, at 1612.
61. See id.
62. See 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 14:19, at 557 (5th ed.
2014). In fact, every circuit other than the Second, Seventh, and Ninth applies this standard.
See, e.g., In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 798 (5th Cir. 2014); Day v. Persels &
Assocs., 729 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013); Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d 372,
377 (3d Cir. 2013); In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 2013); In re
Uponor, Inc., F1807 Plumbing Fittings Prods. Liab. Litig., 716 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir.
2013); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 338 (2012); Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009);
Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003).
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normally affirm the trial judge’s decision unless that decision “rests upon a
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper
application of law to fact.”63 The Second Circuit has tweaked the abuse of
discretion standard of review so that greater deference is given to grants of
class certification than to denials.64 The Seventh Circuit has altered the
abuse of discretion standard in a way that emphasizes careful compliance
with the “rigorous analysis” doctrine outlined by the Supreme Court.65 Part
II.A.1 provides in-depth analysis of the Second Circuit’s standard of
appellate review of class certification decisions. Part II.A.2 assesses the
abuse of discretion standard adopted by the other circuits generally.
Finally, Part II.A.3 sheds light on the standard adopted by the Seventh
Circuit.
1. The Second Circuit’s Approach:
Greater Deference for Grants of Class Certification
The Second Circuit has adopted a novel approach regarding the standard
of review of grants and denials of class certification. One commentator has
gone so far as to take aim at the Second Circuit, alleging that its standard of
appellate review disproportionately favors plaintiffs.66 This approach
follows a long line of case law stemming from a decision in 1983.67
As the Second Circuit noted in a recent holding, it provides greater
deference to the district court if the district court grants class certification
but applies a “noticeably less deferential standard” to denials of class
certification.68 It is critical to not only understand what the Second
Circuit’s standard of review is but how the court has applied it in class
certification decisions spanning several decades. The facts of each case
help color how the Second Circuit has handled issues for plaintiff class
certification in areas ranging from antitrust to labor violations.69
The Second Circuit’s flexibility in applying the abuse of discretion
standard surfaced in Abrams v. Interco Inc.,70 a 1983 antitrust action
alleging price fixing on the part of an apparel manufacturer.71 The case was
filed by a class action attorney on behalf of all purchasers of Interco
63. Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 377.
64. See Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 405 (2d Cir. 2015). The Ninth
Circuit also applies this approach. See Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 673 (9th Cir. 2014).
65. See CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir.
2011). The Supreme Court ruled that a class “may only be certified if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”
Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
66. See Jonah Knobler, Class Actions in the Second Circuit: Do Plaintiffs Have an
Unfair Advantage?, 253 N.Y. L.J. 46 (2015).
67. See Roach, 778 F.3d at 405; Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d
Cir. 2003); see also Lundquist v. Sec. Pac. Auto. Fin. Servs. Corp., 993 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir.
1993); Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993); Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719
F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983).
68. Roach, 778 F.3d at 405.
69. See id.; Abrams, 719 F.2d at 25.
70. 719 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1983).
71. See id. at 25.
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products over a four-year period.72 The theory was that Interco had entered
into an agreement to fix prices with more than seven thousand independent
retail stores across the country.73
After the district court denied class certification, the plaintiffs appealed
the denial and argued that abuse of discretion should be applied only under
limited circumstances, such as when adequacy of representation is not
met.74 The Second Circuit ruled that the abuse of discretion is the proper
standard of appellate review in class certification decisions, with the caveat
that the standard must be applied flexibly.75 As such, it blurred the lines
between the abuse of discretion and de novo standards, holding a “judge’s
discretion is not boundless and must be exercised within the applicable
rules of law or equity.”76 Ultimately, the court upheld the district court
ruling denying class certification, in large part because providing notice to
class members would be tedious, rendering the lawsuit unmanageable.77
Ten years later, the court elucidated its standard of appellate review on
class certification decisions in Robidoux v. Celani,78 laying the foundation
for the standard that is still used today.79 Robidoux dealt with a class action
lawsuit by individuals applying for public assistance in Vermont suing for
unlawful delays by the Vermont Department of Social Welfare in
determining eligibility for the assistance.80 The plaintiffs contended that
the defendant’s failure to process their applications within the thirty-day
guideline mandated by federal law constituted hardship because these
individuals relied on public assistance as their sole source of income.81
The plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all current and future recipients
of public assistance in Vermont.82 The district court denied class
certification because the class size failed the numerosity requirement of
Rule 23(a)(1).83 The court reasoned that the class consisted of only three
actual plaintiffs, and the other members of the class were an undetermined
number based on speculation.84 The court also ruled that the class failed
the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) because recipients of a fuel
assistance program did not suffer any delay or refusal.85
On appeal, the Second Circuit modified the standard of appellate review
in class certification decisions.86 The court began its opinion by noting that
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 27–28.
75. See id. at 28.
76. Id. (quoting Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 193 (4th
Cir. 1977)).
77. Id. at 30–34.
78. 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993).
79. See id. at 935.
80. See id. at 933.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 934.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 935.
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district courts should receive tremendous deference in determinations of the
facts of a case but deserve little deference on the legal conclusions forming
the basis of their rulings on class certification.87 The court further stated
that abuses of discretion occur more frequently in class certification denials
than in other areas of the law, though it declined to say why.88
Applying this standard, the Second Circuit held that the class should have
been certified even though it consisted of only three plaintiffs.89 It
determined that the numerosity requirement only necessitates a finding that
joinder of all class members is “impracticable,” not “impossible.”90
Moreover, there is no exact number or class size to satisfy the requirement,
and the preliminary evidence that there were delays in 22 to 133 cases per
month was sufficient.91 Finally, the court held that the typicality element
was met, even though the class definition was overly broad, because the
district court needed to determine as a matter of fact whether there were at
least some recipients of the fuel assistance program who suffered from
delay or refusal.92
This holding set a standard that was subsequently modified in Lundquist
v. Security Pacific Automotive Financial Services Corp.,93 which was
decided shortly after Robidoux.94 The case dealt with a consumer class
action alleging violations of the Consumer Leasing Act by the defendant.95
The complaint included violations of federal consumer protection law, state
common law, and “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” statutes.96
Plaintiff Betty Lundquist sought to certify a class consisting of all persons
who signed leases with the defendant similar to the one she signed: her
automobile lease held her in default and liable if she decided to terminate it
early.97
The district court declined to certify the class for failure to satisfy the
commonality and typicality requirements.98 On appeal, the Second Circuit
remodeled the abuse of discretion standard, following its previous rulings
that had loosened the standard.99 It concluded from the holdings in Abrams
and Robidoux that the court is “noticeably less deferential to the district
court when that court has denied class status than when it has certified a
87. See id. (“Except to the extent that the ruling is based on determinations of fact . . . or
where the trial judge’s experience in the instant case or in similar cases has given him a
degree of knowledge superior to that of appellate judges, as often occurs, review of class
action determinations for ‘abuse of discretion’ does not differ greatly from review for error.”
(citation omitted)).
88. See id.
89. See id. at 935–36.
90. Id. at 935.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 936–37.
93. 993 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1993).
94. See id. at 14.
95. See id. at 12.
96. Id. at 14.
97. See id. at 12–14.
98. See id. at 14.
99. See id.
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class.”100 Applying this standard, the court concluded that the district court
did not abuse its discretion, and it affirmed the lower court’s ruling.101
While the Lundquist Court did not rule in the plaintiff’s favor, it crafted
the modern standard for the Second Circuit to apply in subsequent
decisions.102 The standard seemed to flow naturally from the prior
decisions in Abrams and Robidoux.103 This new standard was applied in a
2003 decision pertaining to a consumer class action against Time Warner
Entertainment, Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.104 In Parker, two
cable subscribers sued Time Warner for violating federal and state
consumer protection law by disclosing consumer information to third
parties.105
The plaintiffs moved to certify a class including subscribers to Time
Warner’s cable package whose privacy interests were violated by the
disclosure.106 The district court denied certification on the grounds that the
class failed predominance and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3)(D) due to the
manageability concerns of handling a class with more than twelve million
people.107
The Second Circuit reversed under the clarified abuse of discretion
standard and remanded the case to the district court.108 On the Rule
23(b)(3) issue, the circuit court reasoned that, without further discovery, the
district court could not deny class certification because it was unclear how
many individuals actually were a part of the class or how many would optout.109 Moreover, the district court prematurely applied the “incidental”
standard in the 23(b)(2) analysis when the Second Circuit had, in fact,
adopted a broader “ad hoc” approach.110 Therefore, the court granted a
victory to plaintiffs in a major class action lawsuit.111
The most recent Second Circuit decision applying its modified standard
of appellate review occurred in early 2015 in Roach v. T.L. Cannon
Corp.112 Roach featured a lawsuit by four Applebee’s employees against
T.L. Cannon Corp., which owned the franchises where they were employed,
for federal and state labor law violations.113 The plaintiffs alleged that staff
had to subtract time for statutorily mandated work breaks (rest break claim),
and that they did not receive extra payment when working more than ten
100. Id.
101. See id. at 14–15 (finding that the plaintiff failed to show that the other class members
defaulted under similar circumstances or were harmed by the illegality of the lease).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 14; Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993); Abrams v.
Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983).
104. 331 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 2003).
105. See id. at 15.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 17.
108. See id. at 18–21.
109. See id. at 21–22.
110. Id. at 20.
111. See id. at 22–23.
112. 778 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2015).
113. See id. at 403.
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hours (spread of hours claim), as required by New York law.114 The
plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of Applebee’s employees,
“subclassed” into the two claims.115
The district court denied class certification, holding that the plaintiffs’
failure to “offer a damages model that [is] ‘susceptible of measurement
across the entire class’” prevented class certification.116 The district court
reasoned that the damages in the individual case were too individualized for
class treatment, thereby failing the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3).117 It strictly construed the ruling in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,118
leaving little room for the plaintiffs to satisfy predominance without
creating a class-wide damages model.119
The Second Circuit ruled that the lower court misconstrued the ruling in
Comcast, reversing the district court and vacating the judgment.120 The
court held that Comcast did not overrule an existing line of case law in the
Second Circuit that established that individual ascertainability of damages
itself does not defeat predominance for a Rule 23(b)(3) class.121
The court began by explaining its interpretation of the law set forth by
the Supreme Court in Comcast.122 In that case, the Court dealt with an
antitrust suit where Comcast’s acquisition of a cable television provider
catapulted its market share in Philadelphia from 23.9 percent to 69.5
percent.123 To satisfy predominance, the plaintiffs offered expert testimony
that modeled the injuries on four different theories of antitrust injury.124
However, the Court rejected the argument that this was sufficient to
demonstrate that common issues predominated over individual ones.125 It
relied on its holding in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,126 where it
reaffirmed the “rigorous analysis” requirement to meet 23(b)(3)
predominance.127 This standard allows a court to consider the merits of the
case when reviewing class certification decisions.128 In Comcast, the Court
denied predominance because the model formulated by the plaintiffs’ expert
was based on four different theories of antitrust violations, whereas the
plaintiffs only advanced the “overbuilder” theory in the complaint.129
Thus, in the view of the Second Circuit, Comcast does not stand for the
proposition that inability to measure damages on a class-wide basis
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 404 (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013)).
See id.
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
See id.
See Roach, 778 F.3d at 408–09.
See id.
See id. at 405.
See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430.
See id.
See id. at 1434.
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1428.
See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434.
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automatically results in failure of Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.130 Instead,
it merely states that, to meet the predominance requirement, a class-wide
damages model must measure damages stemming from the class’ asserted
theory only.131 Therefore, in Roach, the district court erred by focusing its
analysis solely on the question of whether class-wide damages could be
measured, because this logic ran contrary to the established jurisprudence in
the Second Circuit.132
2. The Majority Approach: Abuse of Discretion
The majority of circuit courts give strong deference to the lower courts
on class certification decisions.133 The circuits reverse a certification
decision only if “the record provides strong evidence that the trial judge
indulged a serious lapse in judgment” under the abuse of discretion
standard.134 It is useful to illustrate the application of this standard in at
least two cases to contrast with the Second Circuit’s approach.
In Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray,135 the trial court
certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class action of all persons who had sold assets to
the defendant in exchange for the defendant’s common stock.136 In this
Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action, the court found that the common
question of breach of contractual warranty predominated over individual
questions of statute of limitations defenses.137 The appellate court agreed
with the defendant’s argument that the district court was required to
consider affirmative defenses, including statute of limitations defenses,
during the class certification stage.138 However, the court found that the
district court had considered these defenses thoroughly but was not
persuaded that individual issues regarding the defenses should prevent
certification of a claim that otherwise met the Rule 23(a) prerequisites.139
Therefore, the First Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in granting class certification.140

130. See Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 2015).
131. See id.
132. See id. at 409.
133. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 798 (5th Cir. 2014); Day v. Persels &
Assocs., 729 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013); Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d 372,
377 (3d Cir. 2013); In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 2013); In re
Uponor, Inc., F1807 Plumbing Fittings Prods. Liab. Litig., 716 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir.
2013); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012); Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009);
Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003).
134. Lupron, 677 F.3d at 31 (quoting Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60
F.3d 867, 875 (1st Cir. 1995)).
135. 208 F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 2000).
136. See id. at 291–92.
137. See id. at 292–96.
138. See id. at 296.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 299.
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In Rodriguez v. National City Bank,141 the plaintiffs filed a 23(b)(3) class
action against a bank alleging racially discriminatory practices in violation
of the Fair Housing Act.142 The district court found that the class failed
23(a)(2) commonality and denied certification.143 The district court
reasoned that the plaintiffs’ allegation that they were charged more heavily
than other borrowers was inadequate because they failed to show a
disparate impact in each of the loan applications.144 On appeal, the Third
Circuit affirmed the district court ruling, finding that the district court was
within its discretion to require an affirmative showing of commonality on
the part of the plaintiffs.145
3. The Seventh Circuit: Deferential but Not Abject
The Seventh Circuit has adopted an approach that also contrasts with the
Second Circuit but deviates from the majority’s abuse of discretion
standard.146 The Seventh Circuit recognizes that appellate review of a class
certification is deferential;147 however, it adds the caveat that “deferential”
does not mean “abject.”148 The language provided by the Seventh Circuit is
not particularly enlightening as to what the standard actually means, and
thus it warrants further consideration to see how it applies in practice.
The Seventh Circuit standard was recently applied in CE Design Ltd. v.
King Architectural Metals, Inc.,149 a 2011 decision written by Judge
Richard Posner.150 CE Design featured a consumer class action alleging
that the defendant had sent out unsolicited fax advertisements in violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.151 The complaint alleged that
King, the defendant, had sent over 500,000 faxes during one month in
2009.152 The statutory damages were $500 for each violation.153 The
plaintiff, a civil engineering firm which received two advertisements from
the defendant, moved to certify a class of recipients of King advertisements
who had not given express permission to receive faxed advertisements.154
The plaintiff was a professional class action plaintiff that had filed over 150
consumer class actions under the statute.155

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
2011).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

726 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2013).
See id. at 374. The plaintiffs were minority mortgage borrowers. See id.
See id. at 376.
See id.
See id. at 378–79.
See CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir.
See id.
Id.
637 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2011).
See id. at 723.
See id.
See id. at 724.
See id.
See id. at 723–24.
See id. at 723.
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The district court certified the class, finding that the class had met the
requirements in Rule 23(a).156 However, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit
vacated the lower court ruling and remanded it under the
“deferential . . . [but not] abject” standard of appellate review.157 The court
focused its analysis on the defendant’s contention that the class did not
meet the adequacy of representation or typicality of the claims
requirements.158 The court held that the Seventh Circuit standard asks
whether the claim of the class representative would be subject to defenses
typical to the rest of the class.159 If the defense asserted against the plaintiff
is not typical, the class representative is not adequate under Rule
23(a)(4).160 The defense asserted against the plaintiff was a consent
defense based on the theory that the plaintiff posted its fax number and the
words “Contact Us” on its website, soliciting advertisements.161
The court found that this defense might have been atypical of the rest of
the class, potentially defeating certification for the plaintiffs on both
typicality and adequacy.162 The court reasoned that the consent defense
would be especially applicable to the class representative because it listed
its information in the Blue Book for businesses.163 Moreover, the class
representative potentially lacked credibility because the president of the
civil engineering firm that served as plaintiff appeared to misunderstand the
purpose of subscribing to the Blue Book during his deposition.164 In light of
the evidence against certification, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to
the district court.165 However, it noted that the plaintiffs could circumvent
the typicality and adequacy limitations by adding new class representatives
and creating subclasses for certification.166
B. The Predominance Requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)
in Rule 23(c)(4) Single Issue Class Actions
Another dichotomy exists in the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3).167 Rule 23(b)(3) requires that (1) common issues of fact or law
“predominate” over individual ones and (2) that the class action is superior
156. See id. at 727–28.
157. Id. at 723.
158. See id. at 724.
159. Id. at 725.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 728.
163. See id. at 725.
164. See id. at 725–26.
165. See id. at 728.
166. See id.
167. See Michael J. Wylie, Note, In the Ongoing Debate Between the Expansive and
Limited Interpretations of Fed R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A), Advantage Expansivists!, 76 U. CIN. L.
REV. 349, 354 (2007) (defining the Second Circuit view as an “expansive” reading of
23(c)(4) and the Fifth Circuit view as a “limited” interpretation). Compare In re Nassau Cty.
Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226–27 (2d Cir. 2006) (certifying a 23(b)(3) class in a
23(c)(4) class action), with Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996)
(reversing the district court’s decision to certify a 23(b)(3) class in a 23(c)(4) class action).
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to other methods of resolving the controversy.168 Rule 23(b)(3) lists a
To satisfy
number of factors relevant to these considerations.169
predominance, the judge may order class treatment to particular issues
under 23(c)(4).170
The Second Circuit and Fifth Circuit have different criteria for satisfying
the predominance requirement of 23(b)(3) in 23(c)(4) single issue class
actions.171 The Second Circuit has a more lenient approach in allowing
predominance,172 while the Fifth Circuit is more restrictive in granting
certification of 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions.173 Part II.B.1 dissects the
Second Circuit’s treatment of predominance in single issue class actions,
while Part II.B.2 analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s approach toward
predominance in 23(c)(4) class actions.174
1. The Second Circuit Approach:
Sufficient Cohesion to Satisfy Predominance
The Second Circuit predominance standard emerged in 2006 in In re
Nassau County Strip Search Cases,175 a civil rights class action alleging
constitutional violations on the part of the Nassau County Police
Department in New York.176 Nassau County had a blanket policy of strip
searching all newly admitted detainees arrested for committing
misdemeanors.177 The plaintiffs sued under federal civil rights law, federal
constitutional law, and New York State constitutional law.178 After
consolidation of three separate class actions, the plaintiffs moved to certify
a class of “all persons arrested for or charged with non-felony offenses who
have been admitted to the Nassau County Correctional Center and strip
searched without particularized reasonable suspicion.”179
The district court denied certification of the 23(b)(3) class for failure to
satisfy predominance.180 The court reasoned that the individual issues in
168. These class actions are known as “common question” class actions whereby
common questions must predominate over individual ones. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see
also RICHARD L. MARCUS, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & HOWARD M. ERICHSON, COMPLEX
LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 299–301 (6th ed.
2015).
169. (1) The class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions, (2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members, (3) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, and (4) the likely
difficulties in managing a class action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D).
170. See id. 23(c)(4).
171. Compare Nassau Cty., 461 F.3d at 226–27, with Castano, 84 F.3d at 741.
172. See Nassau Cty., 461 F.3d at 226–27.
173. Castano, 84 F.3d at 741.
174. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 4:91, at 385–86 (noting that only the Second
Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit have explicitly adopted positions on this issue).
175. 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006).
176. See id. at 221.
177. See id. at 222.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 223.
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the case predominated over the common ones.181 Primarily, there were
individual questions of whether subordinate officers had reasonable
suspicion to search detainees in some cases, whether there was proximate
causation for each injury, and calculations of punitive and compensatory
damages.182 These issues weighed against the common questions of
whether the defendants implemented a blanket strip search policy, whether
it was unconstitutional, and whether all or some of the defendants were
liable.183
Applying its unique standard of review, the Second Circuit articulated
that the predominance inquiry requires that the proposed class is
“sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”184 Under
this predominance test, the court reversed the district court ruling denying
class certification.185
The Second Circuit acknowledged that variations among class members
regarding applicability of defenses do not necessarily prevent eventual class
certification.186 It then surveyed the different stances among the federal
appellate courts on this precise question, noting that the Fifth Circuit
adopted a strict interpretation of predominance,187 while the Ninth Circuit
allows isolation of common issues for class treatment.188 The Second
Circuit favored the Ninth Circuit approach largely because this
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) was consistent with the plain language of the
Rule as well as the intent of the drafters.189 Furthermore, predominance
analysis condenses to whether a particular issue is “susceptible to
generalized, class-wide proof.”190
In Nassau County, a portion of this proof came in the form of a
concession by the defendants that they had committed constitutional
violations by instituting the strip search policy.191 In fact, at this point the
policy had already been rescinded by Nassau County.192 Preventing
consideration of concession issues in predominance analysis would force
each plaintiff to sue individually and prove the defendant’s liability,193
whereas certifying the class would have the binding, preclusive effect on
the issue of Nassau County’s liability. The court recognized that a
significant rationale for the continuance of the class action was to place
absent class members on notice of the action.194
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 224–25.
185. See id. (quoting In re Vista Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 136
(2d Cir. 2001)).
186. See id. at 225–26.
187. See id. at 226.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Id. at 227.
191. See id. at 228.
192. See id. at 222.
193. See id. at 228.
194. See id. at 229.
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The logic was that many individuals in New York State were unaware
that their rights were constitutionally violated and thus would have no
recourse to pursue a legal remedy without mandatory notification through
class certification.195 Denying plaintiffs the benefit of aggregate litigation
would be counterproductive when, ironically, the issue of liability in this
23(c)(4) class action was uncontested.196
2. The Fifth Circuit Approach:
The Cause of Action as a Whole Must Satisfy Predominance
The Fifth Circuit’s approach is the polar opposite of the Second Circuit’s
approach. Its standard came from what was one of the largest class actions
ever attempted in federal court, Castano v. American Tobacco Co.197 Here,
the American tobacco industry was sued by a class of nicotine-dependent
Americans who bought cigarettes manufactured by the defendants.198 The
plaintiffs sued under nine causes of action, including fraud, breach of
express warranty, breach of implied warranty, negligent misrepresentation,
and violation of state consumer statutes.199 The plaintiffs sought to break
this complex class action into four phases.200 The court certified the class
under 23(a) and 23(b)(3), finding that the class met the predominance and
superiority requirements under each of the four trial phases.201
On interlocutory appeal by the defendants, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court, holding that two essential questions had not been
answered.202 The first was that the district court failed to account for
variations in state law in finding predominance and superiority.203 The
second was that the district court did not address how a trial would be
conducted with so many complex issues to be resolved.204 Both issues
militated against a finding that common issues predominated.205
On the first question, the court reasoned that there were variances in state
law on at least four of the causes of action listed in the complaint, in
addition to affirmative defenses and punitive damages.206 Moreover, the
district court merely glossed over the choice-of-law question and did not
articulate any kind of methodology it would adopt in deciding the choice of
law that would apply for each cause of action.207 Finally, it did not discuss
195. See id.
196. See id. at 228.
197. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
198. See id. Additionally, the class included the estates of nicotine-dependent Americans
and the family members of these individuals.
199. See id.
200. The four phases were (1) identify issues of core liability, (2) determine
compensatory damages, (3) apply compensatory damages to individual members, and (4)
apply the punitive damage ratio based on compensatory damages. See id. at 738.
201. See id. at 738–39.
202. See id. at 740.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 740–41.
206. See id. at 741–43.
207. See id. at 743.
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how the class action would remain manageable in the face of potentially
fifty applicable legal standards on each state cause of action.208
On the second question, the court found the district court’s predominance
inquiry was inadequate because the court refused to go past the pleadings to
make such a determination.209 The Fifth Circuit held that this was an
improper application of Rule 23(b)(3) because the lower court was
attempting to advance the case due to its individual merits, while the
predominance inquiry is intended to be a strictly legal determination.210
Furthermore, without an analysis beyond the pleadings, it would be
impossible to determine how individual addiction claims and levels of
exposure could be treated on a class-wide basis.211 Lastly, high individual
damages awards made individual suits possible, defeating the superiority of
the class action.212
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that individual issues (in this case,
choice of law considerations and individual addiction claims) cannot be
merged into the other common issues for class-wide treatment.213
Predominance requires going beyond the pleadings to determine if the
substantive law weighs in favor of certifying the class action.214 As the
Fifth Circuit believes, severing issues under Rule 23(c)(4) would not help
the class meet certification because the cause of action as a whole must
satisfy the requirements.215
C. Certifying Defendant Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)(2)
Defendant class actions, whereby a class represented by a plaintiff sues a
class represented by a defendant, are considered a rarity in federal court, in
large part because the class certification requirements are the same as
ordinary plaintiff class actions.216 However, they are important devices to
enforce substantive legal rights, particularly in civil rights cases when
numerous government officials are being sued and therefore deserve
scrutiny in the certification context.217 Defendants scarcely will choose to
serve as the class representative, forcing the plaintiff to choose one
instead.218 The result is that courts may be less willing to determine that
208. See id. The applicable state law varied on fraud, products liability, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages, among other substantive legal
considerations. See id. at 742 n.15.
209. See id. at 744.
210. See id. at 745.
211. See id. at 744–45.
212. See id. at 748.
213. See id. at 740–41.
214. See id. at 744.
215. See id. at 745 n.21.
216. According to one study, there were 688 plaintiff class action settlements in federal
court in 2006–2007 and only three defendant class actions. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An
Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 811, 817–18 (2010).
217. See Francis X. Shen, The Overlooked Utility of the Defendant Class Action, 88
DENV. U. L. REV. 73, 74 (2010) (arguing that defendant class actions further social welfare).
218. See MARCUS, SHERMAN & ERICHSON, supra note 168, at 361.
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the class satisfies adequacy because defendants only reluctantly serve as
class representatives.219
One particular controversy in defendant class actions is whether these
types of lawsuits can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).220 While 23(b)(1)
class actions are generally accepted221 and 23(b)(3) class actions are
possible, though unfeasible, there is no clear consensus on actions based on
declaratory or injunctive relief (23(b)(2) class actions).222 The Second
Circuit has taken the view that 23(b)(2) defendant class actions can pass
certification while the majority of circuits have interpreted the Rule as only
applying to plaintiff class actions.223 Part II.C.1 scrutinizes the Second
Circuit’s functional approach, which allows defendant classes in 23(b)(2)
class actions. Part II.C.2 then examines the literal approach, which declines
to certify defendant class actions.
1. The Second Circuit’s Functional Approach:
Permitting Defendant Classes in 23(b)(2) Class Actions
The Second Circuit first ruled on this issue in Marcera v. Chinlund,224 a
case against forty-two county sheriffs in New York State.225 The chief
allegation was that these sheriffs (and by extension, the counties) had
violated the constitutional rights of detainees who were required to remain
in police custody until trial.226 These detainees sued on the theory that they
were denied the opportunity to see their families before trial.227
Two plaintiffs who were inmates at the Monroe County jail served as the
class representatives for the plaintiffs.228 Sheriff William Lombard of
Monroe County likewise served as class representative for the defendants,
consisting of the forty-two sheriffs across New York State who had
instituted this policy of detainment.229 However, the district court ruled

219. See id.
220. Compare Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 478 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that defendant
classes may be certified under 23(b)(2)), with Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34, 39–40 (1st
Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant classes cannot be certified under 23(b)(2)), and Henson v.
East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 417 (7th Cir. 1987) (declining to certify a 23(b)(2)
defendant class). These differences are a byproduct of the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2),
which allows certification when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class.” See FED R. CIV. P. 23 (b)(2) (emphasis added); see
also 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 5:22, at 464 (noting that the language of the Rule is
“deceptively complicated”). The Second Circuit has adopted a “functional” interpretation of
23(b)(2) while other circuits read the Rule “literally.” See id. § 5:22, at 465–67.
221. See, e.g., Henson, 814 F.2d at 412 (ruling that defendant classes “plainly are
permitted under Rule [23](b)(1)”); Wyandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City, 214 F.R.D.
656, 664 (D. Kan. 2003) (certifying a defendant class under 23(b)(1)(B)).
222. See MARCUS, SHERMAN & ERICHSON, supra note 168, at 361–62.
223. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
224. 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 915 (1979).
225. See id. at 1235.
226. See id. at 1237.
227. See id. at 1235.
228. See id.
229. See id.
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that the defendant class failed certification.230 It held that Rule 23(a)(3)
typicality and 23(a)(4) adequacy of representation were not satisfied
because the defenses asserted by Sheriff Lombard were not typical of the
defenses asserted by the other sheriffs.231 Lombard claimed that contact
visits posed a security risk to the Monroe County jail because they would
create potential violence among inmates and incentivize smuggling of
contraband into the jail.232 Although the other jails would be making
similar claims, Lombard reasoned that his modern, 325-inmate facility was
substantially different from other ones in the state, such as the jail in rural
Wyoming County.233
The Second Circuit disagreed with this logic, holding that the class
satisfied typicality and adequacy.234 The Second Circuit found that
Lombard had made strong defenses of his position, making him an adequate
representative of the other sheriffs across the state.235 Moreover, his
defense was typical of the defenses other sheriffs were making because the
rationales prohibiting contact visits were generally limited to security,
Additionally, while the class
inmate violence, and contraband.236
representative himself opposed certification, the court ruled that the
representative need not be willing, only adequate under Rule 23(a)(4).237
The Second Circuit ultimately held that defendant class actions may be
permitted under Rule 23(b)(2) despite the defendant’s unwillingness to
serve as class representative.238
Though the Second Circuit was not bound by this vacated judgment, it
chose to follow its prior reasoning almost thirty years later in Brown v.
Kelly.239 In Kelly, the court dealt with a class of plaintiffs suing the state
for enforcement of a penal law deemed unconstitutional.240 The plaintiff
class included all persons arrested, summonsed, or prosecuted under the
law, and the defendant class consisted of all New York State law
enforcement officials with the powers to enforce the statute.241
The district court certified both the plaintiff and defendant classes,
finding that the certification requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) were
met.242 However, the Second Circuit reversed on appeal, finding that both
classes failed typicality and adequacy.243 The court reasoned that the
230. See id. at 1239.
231. See id. at 1238–39.
232. See id. at 1238.
233. See id. at 1239.
234. See id. at 1238–39.
235. See id. at 1238.
236. See id. at 1238–39.
237. See id. at 1239.
238. See id. (“[C]ourts must not readily accede to the wishes of named defendants in this
area, for to permit them to abdicate so easily would utterly vitiate the effectiveness of the
defendant class action as an instrument for correcting widespread illegality.”).
239. 609 F.3d 467 (2d Cir. 2010).
240. See id. at 470.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 474–75.
243. See id. at 482.
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defendant class representatives might be liable for compensatory and
punitive damages in addition to injunctive relief, whereas the class
members themselves were only subject to injunctive relief.244 Moreover,
there was a lack of statewide practice of enforcing the unconstitutional law,
defeating typicality because all state law enforcement officers were being
sued.245
Despite denying certification, the importance of this holding was that the
court continued the rule set out in Marcera: district courts may certify
defendant class actions under Rule 23(b)(2).246 However, it listed two
limitations.247 The first is that the class must be bilateral, which requires
that there are both plaintiff and defendant classes.248 The second is that the
defendant class must consist of public officials and not private actors.249
Ultimately, this approach assists plaintiffs in largescale civil rights class
actions in their ability to sue state officials for unconstitutional policies.250
2. The Literal Approach:
No Defendant Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)(2)
In Tilley v. TJX Cos.,251 the First Circuit outlined the literal approach.252
Here, a graphic designer sued the Dennis East Company and TJX for
copying her design and selling it to more than 550 retailers across the
country.253 The plaintiff moved to certify a defendant class consisting of all
retailers who used her copyrighted design, alleging equitable and injunctive
relief under 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2).254 The district court certified the
defendant class with TJX as the class representative, prompting an
interlocutory appeal from the defendants.255
The First Circuit ruled that Rule 23(b)(2) does not apply to defendant
classes, reasoning that the drafters of the Rule did not contemplate such
circumstances.256 The court relied heavily on the text of the Rule, which
provides that class certification is possible when “the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the

244. See id. at 479–80.
245. In fact, the only non-New York City counties enforcing the law were Rockland, Erie,
Suffolk, and Nassau. See id. at 473.
246. See id. at 479.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 478 n.9.
250. See Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1240 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
442 U.S. 915 (1979).
251. 345 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2003).
252. Id. 39–40. It should be noted that this approach follows a Seventh Circuit decision
from sixteen years earlier. See Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th
Cir. 1987).
253. See Tilley, 345 F.3d at 35–36. The Fourth Circuit also agrees with the literal view.
See Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980).
254. See Tilley, 345 F.3d at 36.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 39–40.
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class.”257 The court emphasized that the Rule only applies to the “party
opposing the class,” not members of the class itself.258
The court added that the drafters made no references to defendant classes
and only used plaintiff classes as examples to illustrate the application of
the Rule.259 Additionally, this case was distinguishable from Marcera
because the class opposing injunctive relief in that case was a group of local
public officials, not actors in the private sector.260 Thus, the court held that
a defendant class could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).261
The dichotomy with defendant class actions is important because the
Second Circuit provides a mechanism for plaintiffs that is not readily
apparent in the text of Rule 23(b)(2).262 While the Second Circuit’s
approach is limited to litigation against public officials, it allows plaintiffs
to use aggregate litigation as a device to hold the state accountable for civil
rights violations.263 Allowing such suits against defendant classes in
injunctive relief cases promotes enforcement of legislative and
constitutional norms by “get[ting] to the heart” of institutional reforms.264
After detailing how the Second Circuit has crafted its standards of
appellate review, predominance, and certification of defendant classes, it is
critical to show how the Second Circuit’s standards are amenable to class
certification. The comparative analysis from this section is dissected in the
next section to determine how favorable the Second Circuit’s standards are
and whether they incentivize forum shopping.
III. DOES THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
INCENTIVIZE FORUM SHOPPING?
This part uses the analysis from the previous section and evaluates the
notion that the Second Circuit’s standards are favorable to class
certification, thereby incentivizing filing class actions in district courts
within the Second Circuit. Part III.A explains the favorability toward class
certification of the Second Circuit’s standards of appellate review,
predominance requirements in 23(c)(4) class actions, and approach to
23(b)(2) defendant class actions. Part III.B then answers the fundamental
question of whether these standards might motivate attorneys seeking class
certification to file in the Second Circuit.

257. Id. at 39.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 40.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 478 (2d Cir. 2010).
263. See id.
264. Scott Douglas Miller, Note, Certification of Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2),
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1378 (1984).
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A. Are the Second Circuit’s Legal Standards
Favorable to Class Certification?
This section is divided into three subsections, each addressing whether
the Second Circuit’s standards are favorable toward class certification. Part
III.A.1 concludes that the Second Circuit’s standard of appellate review is
favorable to class certification. Part III.A.2 surmises that the Second
Circuit’s approach toward Rule 23(b)(3) predominance in Rule 23(c)(4)
class actions is partial toward certification. Finally, Part III.A.3 determines
that the Second Circuit approval of Rule 23(b)(2) defendant class actions is
preferential toward class certification.
1. Standard of Appellate Review
The cases applying the modern Second Circuit standard discussed in Part
II.A.1 indicate that the Second Circuit’s standard of appellate review favors
class certification. The standard articulated explicitly states that appellate
courts should be more deferential toward grants of class certification than
denials.265 While there arguably is a debate as to why and how the Second
Circuit arrived at this standard of appellate review,266 its language and
application are unequivocally advantageous toward certification of class
actions and skeptical of denials.267
In fact, the Second Circuit reversed district court denials of class
certification in a broad spectrum of cases.268 There is no common pattern
in these cases other than the Second Circuit finding that the trial court’s
decision to deny certification was erroneous.269 In contrast, the ordinary
abuse of discretion standard shows no favoritism toward certification or
denial.270 It demonstrates a commitment toward affirming the trial court
ruling, regardless of whether it granted or denied certification.271 The
abuse of discretion standard is decidedly neutral on the issue of certification
and is not heavily biased in favor of certification like the Second Circuit’s
standard.272 The evidence of this assertion is that the abuse of discretion
standard provides significant deference toward the trial court, as each case

265. See Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003).
266. One commentator has gone so far as to suggest that the standard adopted by the
Second Circuit exists only because of a clerical error that occurred between the Abrams and
Robidoux decisions. See Knobler, supra note 66, at 4 (noting that the court in Abrams made
no distinctions between denials and grants of class certification, yet this distinction appeared
in Robidoux).
267. See Lundquist v. Sec. Pac. Auto. Fin. Servs. Corp., 993 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1993).
268. The Second Circuit has reversed class certification denials in social welfare,
consumer protection, and labor cases. See supra Part II.A.1.
269. See supra Part II.A.1.
270. See Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 377 (3d Cir. 2013); Waste Mgmt.
Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir. 2000); see also supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
271. See In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2011).
272. See supra Part II.A.2.
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analyzed in this Note shows.273 Considering that this is the view followed
by eight of the eleven circuits, the Second Circuit’s approach toward the
standard of appellate review of class certification is more favorable toward
class certification than the majority of circuits.274
The Seventh Circuit view appears to be even less favorable toward class
certification than the courts applying the abuse of discretion standard.275 If
the Second Circuit is on the opposite end of the spectrum as a “certification
friendly” forum, and the majority of the circuits are “certification neutral,”
the Seventh Circuit is “certification hostile.”276 While the Seventh Circuit’s
“not abject” language was not as explicit as the Second Circuit’s language
in indicating its view on certification, the case where the standard was
articulated sheds light on how it may apply in practice.277 In CE Design,
the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s decision to grant certification
and remanded the case back to the district court.278 This is a result that
would be highly unlikely under both the Second Circuit’s and majority’s
approaches because each of those standards of appellate review provide
significant deference to the trial court’s decision on class certification.279
The Seventh Circuit’s approach, at least in the way it was applied in the
first instance in CE Design, does not give the same amount of deference on
grants of class certification as the Second Circuit’s or majority’s
standards.280
The Second Circuit’s standard of appellate review of decisions to grant or
deny class certification is an obvious example of the court adopting an
approach favorable to class certification. However, in contrast to the
Seventh Circuit’s “deferential but not abject” standard and the majority’s
abuse of discretion standard, the Second Circuit’s candid preference for
certification becomes even clearer. Considering the Second Circuit (along
with the Ninth Circuit) adopted a position that is more supportive of class
certification than the rest of the federal appellate courts, the Second
Circuit’s law on this issue clearly favors class certification.281
2. Satisfying Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance
in a Rule 23(c)(4) Class Action
The difference in jurisprudence between the Second and Fifth Circuits on
this particular issue presents a fairly clear dividing line.282 The Second
273. See discussion supra Part II.A.2; see also Waste Mgmt. Holdings, 208 F.3d at 291–
92 (illustrating the amount of deference abuse of discretion provides to the lower court on
class certification decisions).
274. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part II.A.3.
276. See supra Part II.A.3.
277. See CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir.
2011).
278. See id. at 728.
279. See supra Part II.A.1–2.
280. See CE Design, 637 F.3d at 723.
281. See supra Part II.
282. See supra Part III.A.2.
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Circuit requires predominance only on the individual question, whereas the
Fifth Circuit requires predominance on the cause of action generally.283
According to a prominent treatise on class actions, this narrow issue does
not appear to have a minority and majority view because most circuits have
not adopted a concrete position.284 Therefore, in determining whether the
Second Circuit’s approach favors class certification, the only point of
comparison (other than the Ninth Circuit) is the Fifth Circuit’s view.285
The Second Circuit’s approach gives significant leeway in meeting the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), and plaintiffs’ attorneys should
be able to move past class certification if they can show predominance on
individual questions.286 In Nassau County, there were still individual
questions regarding reasonable suspicion, damages calculations, and
However, the common question regarding
proximate causation.287
unconstitutional blanket policy predominated over these individual
questions.288 Therefore, for an attorney filing in this forum, satisfaction of
predominance in a Rule 23(c)(4) class action is relatively simple. If there is
a single, overarching question that connects the individual ones, like the
question of the strip search policy in Nassau County, predominance should
be met, and the action will move past the certification stage.289
The Fifth Circuit effectively requires plaintiffs to specify the mechanisms
of class treatment on each particular issue.290 This is a heavier burden for
attorneys because it requires them to show predominance on each question
that is presented.291 Essentially, the Fifth Circuit will decline to certify a
Rule 23(b)(3) class if there is an important issue in the trial that will
ultimately require individual determinations.292 For example, in the
Castano case, there were overarching questions of whether cigarettes
caused various illnesses and whether the tobacco industry failed to warn
consumers of the danger of cigarette smoking.293 Under the Second Circuit
rule, this likely would be enough to satisfy predominance.294 Instead, the
Fifth Circuit found that the variances in law, exposure, and causation
predominated over these larger issues enough to not satisfy the
predominance requirement in a 23(c)(4) class.295
The conclusion that can be drawn from these two cases is that the Second
Circuit’s approach makes class certification substantially easier, while the
Fifth Circuit’s stricter position makes it difficult to satisfy in complex class

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra note 174.
See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 4:91, at 385–86.
See In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2006).
See id.
See id. at 227.
See id.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 740–41.
See id. at 737.
See Nassau Cty., 461 F.3d at 223.
See Castano, 84 F.3d at 744.

2016]

CLASS CERTIFICATION AND FORUM SHOPPING

905

actions.296 In fact, when considering which rule to adopt, the Second
Circuit expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s view in favor of the Ninth
Circuit’s standard.297 The Second Circuit chose a view that is more lenient
in granting class certification when compared to the Fifth Circuit’s
approach.298 Therefore, when contrasted with the Fifth Circuit’s rule, the
Second Circuit’s approach favors class certification on this issue.
3. Certifying Rule 23(b)(2) Defendant Class Actions
The Second Circuit is unique in permitting plaintiffs to sue a class of
defendants under Rule 23(b)(2).299 The other circuits strictly prohibit this
particular type of class action.300 The Second Circuit actually allows
certification on this issue, whereas other circuits deny the existence of the
Rule 23(b)(2) defendant class action altogether.301 While the Second
Circuit does have limitations to this type of class action, it is abundantly
clear that permitting the certification of a particular type of class action, as
opposed to prohibiting it, is advantageous toward class certification.
Therefore, the Second Circuit approach on Rule 23(b)(2) defendant class
actions favors class certification.
B. The Second Circuit
Encourages Class Action Forum Shopping
Although it is clear that the Second Circuit is more favorable toward
class certification than other circuits, the question remains as to whether
this incentivizes attorneys to file in the Second Circuit as opposed to other
circuits.302
The illustration provided in the introduction of this Note provides an
example of why favorable certification standards similar to the ones
adopted by the Second Circuit would encourage forum shopping.303 As
previously discussed, CAFA has changed the landscape by expanding
federal jurisdiction over class actions.304 Many nationwide class actions
will be unable to satisfy any of the jurisdictional exceptions to diversity
296. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 4:91, at 381 n.5.
297. See Nassau Cty., 461 F.3d at 226.
298. See id.
299. See Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1238 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
442 U.S. 915 (1979).
300. See Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2003); Henson v. East Lincoln
Township, 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1987); see also supra Part II.C.2.
301. Compare Marcera, 595 F.2d at 1235, with Tilley, 345 F.3d at 39–40, and Henson,
814 F.2d at 414; see also supra Part II.C.
302. It is important to emphasize the particular nuance of the argument asserted in this
Note. This Note does not argue that, as an empirical matter, attorneys are actually filing
more frequently in the Second Circuit because of its class certification standards on the three
issues discussed here. Rather, it argues that attorneys seeking class certification in federal
court, all other things being equal, will file their suits in the Second Circuit, particularly if
they seek certification for a Rule 23(b)(3) class on a single issue or a Rule 23(b)(2)
defendant class.
303. See supra Introduction.
304. See supra Part I.A.

906

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

unless the parties and the events are deeply rooted in the forum state.305
The plaintiffs’ attorney may decide to file in state court anyway, in hope of
the (unlikely) event that the case is remanded to state court after being
removed to federal court, because the state law is more favorable to
certification than federal law.306 However, other attorneys might decide to
expedite the process, and avoid the delay of two months or more, by filing
their class action in federal court.307 Moreover, they would prefer this
option if they wish to exercise some discretion over the choice of forum,
which they lose if the defendants remove the case.308
The attorneys who choose this option must prioritize the considerations
that matter when choosing which federal forum best suits their class
action.309 Class certification is not the only consideration or even the
primary consideration for all attorneys.310 Some may consider the
proximity of the forum to their class or the favorability of the discovery
rules.311 However, for an attorney filing a Rule 23(b)(3) single issue class
action under Rule 23(c)(4), or a Rule 23(b)(2) defendant class action,
differences in class certification standards between the circuits will animate
their decision because these class actions are unique and relatively
uncommon.312 The procedural standards are less developed on these issues,
and there are few forums that have lenient standards for these types of
classes.313 Indeed, the choice might be between one forum that allows
certification and one that does not.314 The choice of forum, in these cases,
is quite predictable. Plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking certification of these
classes have little choice but to file the lawsuit in the Second Circuit.
In fact, some plaintiffs’ attorneys prioritize the applicable class
certification law in filing decisions.315 Generally, it appears that state law
on certification is more lenient than federal law.316 However, state court is
not an option in many class actions post-CAFA due to the difficulties in
satisfying one of the jurisdictional exceptions.317 If these attorneys place
high value on lenient certification standards, they will choose the forum that
has procedural requirements meeting this criterion, all other things being
equal.318
305. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012).
306. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Part II.A.2–3.
312. See supra Part II.A.2–3.
313. See supra Part II.A.2–3.
314. See supra Part II.A.3.
315. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
317. See supra Part I.A.
318. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The favorability of the Second Circuit’s
class certification procedures does not only incentivize plaintiffs’ attorneys to file in this
forum, but can likewise incentivize defendants in limited circumstances as well. See supra
note 55 and accompanying text. The study referenced in Part I.B indicates that a significant
percentage of defendants removing a class action to federal court favor strict class
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The Second Circuit’s standard of appellate review would be a
consideration for plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking class certification as well,
even if they were filing ordinary Rule 23(b)(3) or Rule 23(b)(2) class
actions.319 The Second Circuit, when compared to every jurisdiction other
than the Ninth Circuit seems like a safe option if the district court denies
class certification.320 A plaintiffs’ attorney that is unsure whether the class
will be certified could reasonably conclude that he has a better chance of
certification on appeal in the Second Circuit due to the relatively minimal
deference given to denials of class certification.321 Therefore, it is logical,
if all other considerations in the case are equal, that the plaintiffs’ attorney
will file the class action in the Second Circuit.322
The purpose of this Note is not to take aim at CAFA for creating
horizontal forum shopping in the federal system nor to criticize the Second
Circuit for adopting positions that encourage a type of forum shopping.
Instead, this Note highlights that attorneys can utilize the Second Circuit’s
standards when seeking class certification in pivotal class action
lawsuits.323 The case law surveyed in this Note illuminates the kinds of
cases that are impacted by these standards.324
The importance of these outcomes cannot be minimized. The Second
Circuit positions on class certification have allowed the prosecution of
substantive legal rights in major class actions, ranging from
unconstitutional infringement of civil liberties to harms caused by labor
violations.325 Imagine if Castano was decided in the Second Circuit. That
case was one of the largest class action lawsuits in American history.326
Millions of consumers had allegedly suffered injuries from cigarette use.327
At the same time, an entire industry faced significant liability.328 Affirming
the decision to grant class certification by the trial court would have
drastically changed the outcome of that case, potentially striking a stunning
victory for consumers rather than the tobacco industry.329 Viewed in a
vacuum, Rule 23(b)(3) single issue class actions and Rule 23(b)(2)
defendant class actions seem like technical, insignificant rules in the
certification requirements. See supra Part I.B. But this study did not appear to calculate the
number of defendants seeking certification of a settlement in order to reduce the costs of
litigation and the amount owed to the plaintiffs. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
In such a settlement class action, especially if it were a Rule 23(b)(3) single issue class,
defense attorneys would prefer the Second Circuit’s lenient standards on certification. See
supra note 49 and accompanying text. Though this Note is largely geared toward addressing
the forum selection considerations a plaintiff might have, it is important to note that
sometimes defendants are also seeking certification for a settlement.
319. See supra Part II.A.1.
320. See supra Part II.A.
321. See supra Part III.A.1.
322. See supra Part II.A.1.
323. See supra Part II.
324. See supra Part II.
325. See supra Part II.
326. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).
327. See id. at 737.
328. See id. at 752.
329. See generally id.
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broader class action context. Yet the way different forums construct these
“technical rules” has a profound impact on the substantive rights of
Americans in class actions.330
The Second Circuit’s approach toward class certification merits
observation in the coming years. The potential forum shopping described
in this Note is limited to any areas where the Second Circuit currently has
favorable class certification standards. If the Second Circuit continues to
craft additional procedures favorable to class certification, perhaps it might
be time to revisit those standards and consider whether this is a sensible
approach. In the interim, however, the Second Circuit should be noted
among lawyers as a forum that has adopted certification-friendly procedures
on narrow issues that have a substantial influence on the outcome of critical
class action lawsuits.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s class certification jurisprudence, when compared to
that of the other circuits, is distinctly favorable toward certification. The
consequence is that attorneys seeking certification in a federal forum are
incentivized to file their class actions in the Second Circuit due to its
certification-friendly measures. It is unclear whether the Second Circuit
will construct additional procedures amenable to class certification.
However, it is clear that the Second Circuit’s current approach has enabled
plaintiffs to pursue their substantive legal rights in large-scale class action
litigation by allowing their cases to proceed past the certification stage.

330. See supra Part II.

